A political economy approach of India in Senegal. A "win-win" partnership? by Cairó i Céspedes, Gemma & Colom Jaén, Artur
1 
 
 
A political economy approach of India in Senegal. A “win-
win” partnership? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
BRICS are on the rise in the world economy, and indeed this fact has a reflection on 
Africa in terms of growing engagement with the region. The effects of these increasing 
trade, investment and aid flows on the development prospects of Africa are a key issue 
in the political economy of the continent. This article pays attention to a specific case of 
this growing present: India in Senegal. Based on fieldwork in Senegal, we present and 
analyse the features of the Indian presence in the country, and assess the possible 
developmental impact in terms of contribution to economic development. 
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Introduction 
The presence of emerging developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), especially 
China and India, in terms of trade, investment and co-operation, has significantly 
increased in recent times, leading to remarkable and lasting changes in the international 
political economy of the continent. This increasing presence is a reflection of the 
emergence of the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). 
The impressive combined economic growth of these large emerging economies, 
sustained over more than two decades, is producing major changes in several 
dimensions of the world economy, which are creating a real shift in the relative 
importance of BRICS vis-à-vis developed countries in the world economy (OECD 
2010; Ward 2011). In SSA and other developing areas, the BRICS' increasing 
prominence in trade and investment is frequently embedded in institutional and aid 
frameworks promoted by their governments, and commonly known as South-South 
cooperation (SSC) (UNCTAD 2010; Modi 2011). 
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The traditional discourse of SSC in SSA was set up in a framework of North-South 
confrontation following the struggles for independence on the continent and it was 
rather ideological. Now, this discourse includes economic issues corresponding to the 
process of capitalist globalisation. On the one hand, there are aid policies and the 
establishment of strategic coalitions in international fora like the WTO or UN. On the 
other hand these policies are used to reinforce the pattern of increasing trade and 
investment flows from BRICS to SSA, and securing access to strategic natural 
resources, crucial to maintaining the momentum of economic growth in BRICS. The 
promoters of SSC partnerships have traditionally claimed that these partnerships should 
provide mutual benefits for the parties involved. 
In relation with the emergence of BRICS in SSA and the ‘win-win’ hypothesis, a 
vast literature has emerged in African studies to deal with this topic.1 In particular, the 
specific 'China in Africa' topic is the most extensively analysed.2 Although there is a 
less remarkable presence of scholar articles on the 'India in Africa' topic, it has been as 
well investigated.3 Anyhow, case studies of the Indian presence in Africa at country 
level are scarce. In order to help filling this gap and contribute to the current debates on 
the BRICS presence in Africa, this article wants to present a case study, based on 
fieldwork, on the presence of India in Senegal. 
Senegal is a particular case of the Indian presence in SSA, since it is stronger here 
than in other African countries, and also stronger by West African standards. Since the 
end of the 90s, India has developed a remarkable presence in the country. India-Senegal 
bilateral trade has grown steadily, as has Indian investment in the country. This paper 
attempts to study the particular framework and features of the Indo-Senegalese 
partnership, at both public and private levels, taking into account the patterns and 
dynamics of aid programmes, bilateral trade and Indian investments in Senegal.We 
want to analyse as well the impact of this growing Indian presence in Senegal in terms 
of its actual and potential contribution of co-operation links, which could lead to 
economic impacts in terms of development. 
 
Emerging economies and Least Developed Countries: New roles  
                                                 
1
 From a general point of view, see Kragelund (2008), UNCTAD (2010 and 2011b), OECD (2011), Shaw 
et al. (2007), Shaw (2012), Modi (2011) and Martin (2008). 
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In the past decade, BRICS have consolidated as emerging economies in the global 
arena. The great economic performance of BRICS has allowed them to displace 
developed economies as the main contributors to the performance of global aggregate 
demand. In fact, India and China are the sole economies whose economic performance 
during 1980-2000 in terms of economic growth was higher than during the period 1950-
60 (Nayyar 2008). It permits the foreseeable future role of BRICS as engines of the 
world economy for the coming decades, defining in turn a progressive shift to a 
multipolar world economy, a fact actually favoured by the current global crisis (Pieterse 
2011). 
BRICS’ economic dynamism is reflected by their increasing weight in the world 
economy. BRICS’ combined GDP in 2010 was ten-fold that of 1970, a pattern that has 
accelerated during the last decade. It is in the external position of these economies 
where this increasing presence is more obvious. BRICS’ exports share in the world 
economy has increased 10 points in the last forty years, climbing to 13% of world 
exports in 2012. 
With regard to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), BRICS’ share of total inward FDI 
flows has increased from 2.2% in 1990, to 17.8% in 2010, thus becoming significant 
recipients of FDI flows. In fact, in 2010, for the first time, developing and transition 
economies combined received more than 50% of global FDI flows (UNCTAD 2011). 
Regarding FDI outflows, BRICS have recently become active investors in both 
developed and developing countries. In 2010 six developing and transition economies 
were among the top 20 investors. These six countries (China, Russia and India among 
them) invested predominantly (70%) in developing countries, a fact usually claimed as 
SSC. These countries are becoming dynamic investors abroad fuelled by their rapid 
economic growth and the consequent need to position themselves in the world 
economy, and acquire or participate in strategic assets, like natural resources. 
The growing centrality of emerging countries in the global economy has transformed 
their external relations vis-à-vis other developing countries, like Senegal. Some figures 
show this incipient transformation: the share of South-South FDI flows has grown from 
4% in 1998 to 14% in 2009, and South-South merchandise exports in 2009 have 
increased more than four-fold since 1995. Data show this increasing interdependence 
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 We can highlight Cheru and Obi (2010), Mawdsley and McCann (2011), Price (2011), Hugon (2011), 
Goldstein et al. (2006) and Sidiropoulos (2011). 
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although it is also known that the bulk of South-South trade and FDI are concentrated in 
the most dynamic developing countries. 
The economic emergence of BRICS and the subsequent shifts in the world economy 
has seen a consistent increase in new collaborative strategies in international fora among 
emerging and developing countries, which some call the ‘axis of the South’ (Alden and 
Vieira 2006). This reflects some changes in pre-90s SSCframeworks. The question that 
arises is to what extent this co-operation will foster socioeconomic development in 
LDCs, where poverty is widespread and structural blockings persist. 
There are certainly shared interests between governments of the Global South, but 
the main question is whether there are mutual benefits. Is there a basis for the trumpeted 
win-win outcomes of SSC in terms of development? A significant corpus of literature 
has been developed around the growing interdependence between BRICS and LDCs in 
terms of its socioeconomic impact (UNCTAD 2010; Mlachila and Takebe 2011; IMF 
2011a; Samake and Yang 2011; UN and OHRLLS 2011). Some of these works warn 
about the fact that the current pattern of the LDCs-BRICS trade would lead LDCs to 
another commodity trap and consequently lessening its developmental content. In this 
paper the analysis of the Indian presence in Senegal investigates the added value of such 
SSC framework as a specific case study.  
 
India's involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa: the cooperation framework 
Economic and aid strategies  
Political and economic relations between India and SSA have been apparent since the 
post-war period. At the beginning they were linked to anti-colonialist strategies, and 
nowadays they have stronger connections to the emergence of India in the world 
economy in a globalisation context. 
India’s balance of payments crisis that led to a debt crisis in 1991 took the Indian 
economy to a programme of slow but increasing liberalisation, strongly influenced by 
the IMF. By dismantling constraints to trade and FDI, India started to overcome its 
post-independence low rate of growth and expanded considerably its productive and 
consumption capacity. FDI outflows also experienced a significant growth, from 514 
US$ million in 2000 to 14,624 US$ million in 2010. Exports in 2010 were more than 
three-fold those of 2000, increasing from 72,906 US$ million to 261,555 US$ million. 
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(Acharya 2002; Rodrik and Subramanian 2004; Panagariya 2004; Cairó-i-Céspedes 
1997). 
Despite the emergence of India, Africa is not yet a crucial economic partner for her. 
The share of Indian FDI outflows to Africa represented 15.2% of total Indian outflows 
in 2008 (GoI-MOF 2012), and imports from Africa accounted for 7.7% of total Indian 
imports in 2010 (UNCTAD 2012). Nevertheless, the Indian presence is significant for 
Africa considering that in 2008, India was the fifth developing country with the highest 
stock of FDI in Africa, only behind leading Asian investors such as Singapore, China, 
Hong-Kong and Malaysia (UNCTAD 2010, 86).4 
However, the relevant point is the growth rate of trade and investment flows. 
Between 2002 and 2008 Indian FDI in SSA multiplied three-fold and Indian imports 
from this region in 2010 were 20 times those of 1995 (Figure 1). It is worth highlighting 
that these flows are significantly concentrated. For instance, in 2010 41% of Indian 
merchandise imports came from Nigeria, and the offshore financial sector of Mauritius 
received 86% of Indian FDI outflows in 2008-09.5 
So, in spite of the current low aggregate volumes of trade and investment flows and a 
high geographical concentration, there is an incipient interdependence with enough 
foundations to foresee a growing partnership for the near future. 
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 In fact the share of Asian countries of total African FDI inflows has grown from 6.7% in 1995-99 to 
15.2% in 2000-08 (UNCTAD 2010, 81) 
5
 It is also the case of the 750 million $ investment of Indian oil company (OVL) in Sudan in 2002 which 
represented 84% of total Indian foreign investment in SSA. In the case of Mauritius the portfolio nature 
of this investment distorts foreign investment analysis when considering country-wise destination. It is 
due to the fact that Indian data on approvals of foreign investment by destination country is aggregated 
Foreign Direct Investment and Portfolio Investment under the aggregated category of “Foreign 
Investment”. 
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Figure 1 
Indian Merchandise Imports from Sub-Saharan Africa and Indian FDI Outflows to Sub-
Saharan Africa  
 
Source: UNCTAD (2012) and GoI-MOF (2012) 
 
Regarding the content of the trade flows between India and SSA, there is a clear 
asymmetry, since they are reproducing somehow the traditional North-South trade 
pattern. India basically imports raw materials from SSA, and exports manufactured 
products to the region (Figure 2). This trade pattern shows different stages of industrial 
development and economic dynamism, and if it persists it could deepen the weakness of 
inter-industrial linkages in the African economies involved. 
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Figure 2 
Composition of India’s External Trade with Sub-Saharan Africa (2010) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2012) 
 
For a better understanding of the India-Africa partnership we must consider other 
relationships beyond trade and investment. Following the McCormick model (2008) to 
assess the impact of aid from China and India to Africa, India combines monetary and 
non-monetary forms of aid, with a blurred frontier between one and another, thus 
making analysis more complex. If we consider here a wider concept of aid we can 
observe the different dimensions of India’s donor role in SSA. This enlarged concept of 
aid would include the typical financial transfers such as grants or soft loans but also 
technical assistance, equity investment by Indian public companies and preferential 
treatment in trade relationships with LDCs. 
The first aid instrument to mention is the ITEC Programme (Indian Technical and 
Economic Cooperation), which was launched by the Indian government in 1964. ITEC 
depends on the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and aims to share Indian 
development experiences with Southern partners. ITEC basically promotes technical 
assistance through training programmes. With regard to Africa, some 1,000 experts 
from the continent attend training courses in India in a number of technical fields from 
food processing to information technology. This programme accounts for one third of 
the total Ministry budget, with India’s neighbouring countries being the main 
beneficiaries (GoI-MEA 2012). 
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Another Indian instrument of cooperation is the Exim Bank Lines of Credit (LOCs) 
available to India’s trading partners in developing countries for importing Indian 
merchandise and services, carrying a concessional interest rate depending on the 
external debts and economic situation of the recipient countries. In 2004 Government of 
India (GoI) launched the TEAM-9 (Techno-Economic Approach for African 
Movement), in which 8 African countries, including Senegal, plus India, committed to a 
cooperation framework. The deal includes a LOC of 500 US$ million for developmental 
initiatives in these African countries, including technological transfer, and is delivered 
through the Exim Bank. Compared to ITEC programmes, developing countries sharing 
LOCs resources are more geographically balanced. As of February 2012, the total 
amount of Exim Bank operative LOCs amounts to around 8 US$ billion, while 44% was 
addressed to SSA mostly focused on financing rural electrification, transport and 
irrigation projects among others (Eximbank 2012). 
Indian instruments of cooperation in SSA are completed with a trade preferences 
scheme.  The fact that India has become the first developing country to extend the WTO 
scheme Duty Free Quota Free to all LDCs, adopted in Doha in 2001, is relevant. 
India’s Duty Free Tariff Preference Scheme for LDCs came into effect in 2008 with 
tariff reductions spread over five years. This scheme could potentially affect 33 African 
LDCs, although to date only 18 have accessed it (GoI-MEA 2011). This mechanism 
grants duty free access on 94% of India’s total tariff lines, providing preferential market 
access on tariff lines that include 92.5% of global exports of all LDCs. 
 
Shared Interests: a renewed cooperation scheme? 
As we have seen, the current growing and deepening partnership between India and 
SSA started consolidating in late 90s. In recent years, this renewed interest of India in 
SSA was institutionalised at the highest level in the India-Africa Forum Summit held in 
New Delhi in 2008 (GoI-MEA 2008). It was a genuine political effort to reinforce some 
strategies previously established, like the TEAM-9 (Techno-Economic Approach for 
Africa-India Movement), or the Focus Africa Program. It also fostered new partnerships 
through the NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development). 
The Indian presence in SSA starts being discussed in academic literature (Cheru and 
Obi 2010; Carmody 2010; Shaw et al. 2007; Naidu 2008). The major economic appeal 
of SSA is the availability of raw materials that India requires to feed its current pattern 
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of economic growth. Secondly, business opportunities in a greenfield region like SSA in 
terms of infrastructure, pharmaceutical industry, telecommunications technologies and 
agricultural requirements open the door for the expansion of Indian firms abroad. And 
last, but not least, the political interest of India in SSA must be placed in the future 
redefinition of global governance and the position of India in the new international 
order. 
Moreover, this increasing partnership is linked to shared interests regarding some 
sensitive global issues such as agriculture trade liberalisation or climate change 
negotiations. Developing countries' cooperative strategies in international institutions 
like WTO generate positive spill overs in terms of shared motivations, which in turn can 
be translated into more responsible and committed partnerships. The example of the G-
20 developing economies coalition created at the 5th Ministerial WTO Conference held 
in Cancun in 2003 in response to USA and EU protectionist and trade distorted 
practices in agriculture, showed not only the potential of strategic coalitions in pursuing 
common goals but also the success of such a coalition formation rooted in mutual 
interest. 
What kind of partnership enables the strengthening of bilateral and regional 
programs of cooperation among Asian and African countries is a topic of high interest 
(UNCTAD 2010; Naidu 2008; Mawsdsley and McCann 2010). There is a broad 
consensus among authors that Indo-African partnerships combine different aims, such 
as mutual benefit, altruism and strategic interests, notwithstanding the presence of real 
asymmetrical interdependence in economic terms. 
Our focus is to analyse to what extent Indian presence in Africa (in our case Senegal) 
promotes a different kind of partnership that can promote developmental outcomes. 
Investment and assistance (financial or not) from India in strategic sectors can open 
ways to deal with African developmental problems. The aim is to set up an approach 
that considers this mutual interest under a new framework, which differs from the 
traditional one in which Western countries and institutions have established their 
policies vis-à-vis LDCs. 
This new framework must be analysed taking into account the developing status of 
these partners, and forging an attitude of greater equality of treatment towards each 
other. This new relationship pattern can basically be related to the particular way in 
which India gets involved in African countries (Katti et al. 2009). 
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Our focus is on two features of this involvement that are crucial to understanding this 
new kind of relationship. First of all, the prominent role of technical and training 
assistance programmes financed by the Indian government, as well as the participation 
of state-owned Indian enterprises in some investment ventures, differ from the 
traditional North-South financial cooperation towards LDCs. This public nature does 
not mean that economic interest is absent, as the tied nature of Exim Bank LOCs shows. 
Secondly, the declared principle of non-interference and non-conditionality differs 
from the traditional approach sustained by Western donors, which strongly narrows the 
policy-space of recipient countries (Whitfield 2009). Certainly, a distinct feature of the 
South-South partnerships is that they do not narrow policy-space as much as traditional 
partnerships do. This is reinforced by the establishment of dialogue platforms to set the 
basis for new partnerships allowing a new way to capture and adjust competing interests 
among partners. 
 
India in Senegal: a growing partnership 
As early as 1975 both governments officially established diplomatic relations, which 
have been translated into several economic co-operation agreements. For instance, both 
countries have been members of the G-15 since 1989, a coalition of developing 
countries established to cooperate along a wide range of issues related to development. 
Nonetheless, it is not until recent times that Indo-Senegalese relations have intensified, 
to the point that today India can be considered a strong strategic partner for Senegal.The 
Indo-Senegalese partnership is displayed in the increasing trade and FDI flows between 
both countries, and in a growing number of co-operation programmes, including 
agriculture, transport equipment, rural electrification, and information and 
communication technology (ICT). 
India is not at all the only BRICS present in Senegal. As in many other African 
countries, China has a remarkable presence in Senegal, especially in the area of trade 
and public works. China was in 2011 the third source of Senegalese imports behind the 
European Union and Nigeria, accounting for the 7 per cent of the total imports 
(European Commission 2012, 5). We must mention as well the significant amounts of 
aid allocated in Senegal by Islamic countries like Saudi Arabia or Kuwait.67 
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 As for traditional aid partners, France remains the largest donor in terms of allocated money, being 
Canada the 4th among bilaterals (OECD data, see http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/SEN.gif, accessed April 
17, 2013). For Canada, Senegal is one of the seven African "Countries of Focus" defined by Canadian 
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Back to focus on the Indian presence, in Figure 3 we can see that the Indo-
Senegalese aggregate trade value has consistently grown in recent years. In 1996 the 
total merchandise trade between the two countries amounted to 117 US$ million and in 
2010 it had increased almost threefold, totalling 333 US$ million. It is also important to 
highlight that 80 per cent of Senegalese exports to India are concentrated in one 
product: phosphoric acid produced by the Industries Chimiques du Sénégal, the main 
Indian investment in the country. Thus, Senegalese exports to India are strongly shaped 
by this specific Indian private investment, as long as it is not conceived to produce 
goods for the domestic market. 
 
Figure 3. Total Merchandise Trade Senegal-India 
(1996-2010)  
(current US$ million) 
 
Source: own elaboration from UNCTAD (2012) 
 
Regarding the content of the Indo-Senegalese trade, it replicates somehow the 
common pattern of many other African countries, and is consistent with the general 
Indo-African pattern highlighted above. As Figures 4 and 5 show, Senegal exports 
commodities or low-added-value merchandise, and imports mainly manufactured 
products. In this regard, it is worth remembering the case of cashew nut trade pattern 
between Senegal and India. The Casamance region of Senegal, Guinea Bissau and 
Gambia are significant cashew nut producers, and the main part of their production is 
exported to India through Banjul, the capital of Gambia. The raw nuts are processed in 
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India, and then a share of them exported to Senegal, Guinea Bissau and Gambia. So, it 
is possible to buy in Dakar cashew nuts grown in the country, but processed in India and 
sold with the label “Made in India” (Red River 2010). Regarding phosphoric acid, 
which is the main Senegalese export to India; it is not strictly speaking raw material, it 
is rather a commodity with low added value. Phosphoric acid is the product of an 
industrial transformation of the raw phosphate rock, which involves basically crushing 
the rock and subsequent chemical treatment. This process can be considered a first stage 
of industrial processing which adds some value to the raw phosphate rock. This process 
is not a highly technologicalone, but certainly triggers some modest product linkages 
that could lead tomore sophisticated activities undertaken by local firmswith potential 
developmental outcomes (Morris et al. 2011). 
 
Figure 4 
Structure of Senegalese merchandise exports to India 
(period averages) 
 
Source: own elaboration from UNCTAD (2012) 
 
 
On the import side, a significant part is machinery and transport equipment. These 
imports have been increasing in relation to other imports in the last fifteen years, and 
include tractors, vans and buses for public transport, and water pumps. Not all of these 
manufactured goods are for private consumption; they are rather inputs for activities 
like agriculture or for improving mobility in urban areas. Interestingly, these imports are 
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 For a more comprehensive view of the economic exchanges and co-operation frameworks existing in 
Senegal with emerging countries, see Colom-Jaén (2013). 
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linked to a great extent to Indian public co-operation policies. In sum, although there is 
some scope to see potential developmental linkages, in terms of technological 
upgrading of existing activities, trade pattern tends to reproduce the traditional North-
South trade pattern. 
In the following sections we will focus on different features of the Indian presence in 
Senegal. A cutting distinction between public and private dimensions of this presence is 
not useful, because in many cases the presence of Indian firms is not purely a private 
affaire, and involves Indian conscious public policies. Thus, we will present these 
features not on the basis of a distinction of being a public or private initiative, but on a 
case-by-case basis. 
 
Figure 5 
Structure of Senegalese merchandise imports from 
India (period averages) 
 
Source: own elaboration from UNCTAD (2012) 
 
 
Natural resources on the stake: the takeover of Industries Chimiques du Sénegal 
The flagship industrial company of Senegal, Industries Chimiques du Sénégal (ICS), is 
nowadays controlled by an Indian consortium, which holds 85 per cent of the shares. At 
the same time, this is the largest Indian investment in the country. ICS is the leading 
industrial enterprise of the country in terms of jobs (around 1,900), sales, and assets 
(around 2% of the Senegalese GDP comes from ICS). ICS is also a significant player in 
the regional and global fertiliser industry.8 
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 Data contained in this section regarding ICS were provided by the company unless otherwise stated. 
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Based on a remarkable site of phosphate rock of exceptional quality in Taïba (100 
km north-east Dakar, exploited since 1948), the company established a factory close to 
the mine at the end of the 1970s to transform this rock into phosphoric acid, which is 
the basic component of many fertilisers. The factory, called DarouKhoudoss, started its 
activities in 1984. This acid is the basic component of many fertilisers. Finally, the third 
step to vertical integration is another chemical factory in Mbao, 18 km. eastwards from 
Dakar, which manufactures fertilisers mainly out of the phosphoric acid produced in 
DarouKhoudoss. 
ICS has two subsidiaries. The first one is the Société d'Exploitation Ferroviaire des 
ICS (Sefics), which covers the logistic needs of the company. Sefics owns and operates 
the exclusive railway that links all the production sites with the port of Dakar. The 
second subsidiary is Senchim, the division of ICS devoted to marketing the final output 
produced in Mbao in Senegal and West Africa, and also to ship the phosphoric acid 
produced in DarouKhoudoss to India. 
The seed of the today existing ICS was sown in 1976, when the Government of 
Senegal (GoS) established the Société des Industries Chimiques du Sénégal (SICS), a 
company devoted to transform the phosphate rock into phosphoric acid and then into 
fertilisers. The SICS was created in the context of the GoS'Impulsion Externe policy, 
which took place at the beginning of the 1970s, when an exhausted GoS' treasury had to 
lean on international credit to develop its 3rd and 4th Development Plans. These loans 
covered not only current expenditures, but also large investments, like the SICS. The 
point here is that SICS, later transformed in ICS, was part of a plan that contributed 
crucially to the growth of the state apparatus and the development of an accumulating 
class linked to the state that has shaped the capitalist development of the country 
(Boone 1992, 172-177).9 
Until the 80s, ICS was a parastatal in which the GoS had 53 per cent of the shares (an 
investment supported by international credit). Among the shareholders were the 
governments of Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Nigeria, a fact that reflects the regional 
projection that ICS had when it was established. There were also private firms among 
the shareholders like Rhône-Poulenc (France), Southern Petrochemicals Industries 
Corporation (SPIC, from India) and Indian Farmers Fertilisers Cooperative 
(IFFCO).In fact, since the beginning of ICS, IFFCO has been almost the only client. 
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When the structural adjustment programmes started in the early 1980s, a process of 
increasing privatisation began, and in 1986 a pack of shares was sold to international 
private investors, taking GoS’ stake from 53 to 47 per cent, thus losing the majority. 10 
In 2003 IFFCO and SPIC increased significantly their stake (a process that had started 
in 1988) in order to invest in doubling the capacity of the DarouKhoudoss facilities 
(Bermúdez-Lugo 2003, 16.3). 
In 2006, ICS had serious problems and faced the possibility of bankruptcy.  This was 
due mainly to the low international prices of phosphoric acid combined with an increase 
in the exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar (many ICS inputs are denominated 
in euros and ICS exports in dollars). In addition, the company experienced serious 
internal management problems. These developments caused some deterioration in the 
financial situation of the company, and led the GoS to begin negotiations in December 
2005 with an Indian consortium, composed of IFFCO and the Archean Group11, in order 
to encourage them to invest in the restructuring of the company.12 Owing to these 
difficulties, the company temporarily interrupted production (Bermúdez-Lugo 2006, 
18.3). 
In July 2007 an agreement between the Indian consortium and the GoS was reached 
to recapitalise the company (IMF 2007, 53). When the agreement was finally executed 
(April 2008), the consortium had invested more than 100 US$ million and its stake in 
the company went up to 85 per cent, bringing down GoS to 15 per cent.13 
After the 2006 crisis, production recovered and today the prospects for the company 
are good, boosted by a solid and growing Indian demand coupled with high 
international prices of rock phosphate (see Figure 6).14 
 
Figure 6 
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 To get a general view of the process of adjustment in the whole industrial sector in Senegal, see Guèye 
(1997) and Boone (1991). 
11Archean Group is a holding of Indian companies based in Chennai (Tamil Naidu state), and focused on 
chemical industry. 
12
 The GoS also had to bailout ICS in February 2006, as a payment default would put the entire financial 
system of the country at risk, since the majority of the creditors were Senegalese banks (AfDB/OECD 
2006, 450). 
13
 This 85 per cent is divided into 18.54 per cent for IFFCO’s own resources, 66 per cent for the Archean 
Group, which participates in the consortium through Senfer Africa Ltd, and 0.46 per cent for the Indian 
government. 
14
 In the international markets, the price of phosphate rock, has multiplied six fold between the end of 
2007 and mid-2008, reaching almost 300 US$ per tonne. Between February 2011 and June 2013, the 
prices seems to have stabilised in the range from 165 to 202.50 dollars per tonne (data from the "Pink 
Sheet", World Bank Commodity Price Data). 
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Industries Chimiques du Sénégal, total production 1996-2011 
(tonnes) 
 
Source: Industries Chimiques du Sénégal 
 
 
Although a modest presence in the shareholding, today IFFCO leads ICS. The 
management of ICS depends on IFFCO, and at the same time IFFCO is the main client 
of ICS. IFFCO is the world’s largest fertiliser cooperative federation, whose main 
activity is to manufacture fertilisers in their 5 plants in India, and distribute these 
fertilisers among 55 million farmers in the country.15It is estimated that 58 per cent of 
the phosphoric acid IFFCO needs comes from Senegal, which means 30 per cent of 
Indian agricultural needs (Hazard et al. 2009).  Certainly Senegalese phosphates are key 
to explaining the consolidation of the Green Revolution achievements in India. 
The entrance of IFFCO in ICS, both world-class companies, constitutes a strategic 
drive of a TNC pursuing vertical integration in a foreign country. Apparently, this 
venture goes a step beyond the classical securitisation of raw materials supply, because 
it involves investment and securitisation of the supply of an intermediate output, as 85 
per cent of the phosphoric acid production is intended to go to India under the current 
agreement. This requires a first stage industrial manipulation as explained in the 
                                                 
15
 IFFCO started its activities in 1967 with the aim to produce fertilisers to fill the gap observed in the 
country between supply and demand of fertilisers. Nowadays, IFFCO is registered as a Multistate 
Cooperative Society, with its headquarters in New Delhi, and has around 40,000 member cooperatives all 
over the country. IFFCO has been ranked number 37 by Fortune magazine in the India 500 List 
corresponding to 2011, which portrays the biggest companies in India (see http://www.iffco.nic.in). 
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introduction, that leaves some added value in the country, and contributes to the 
creation of some forward and backward linkages, like the railway and the port. 
Moreover, the phosphoric acid left in the country (15%) is intended for use in 
manufacturing fertilisers in the Mbao facilities, thus contributing to an increase in the 
agricultural productivity of Senegal and the region. 
However, the production of fertilisers in Mbao is very weak. The 2008 investment 
deal did not include the fertiliser factory, as the Indian consortium showed no interest in 
reinforcing the local production of fertilisers. In fact, between 2009 and 2011 the actual 
production of fertilisers covered on average only 41 per cent of the budgeted 
production. Nowadays, the Mbao factory suffers from serious managerial dysfunctions, 
and ICS wishes to transfer the property to the GoS, who is looking for a technical 
partner to take on the factory. This is certainly a backlash to the prospects of ICS to 
become a strategic fertiliser supplier for Senegal and the region, and shows that it is not 
the interest of the Indian investors to develop linkages with the rest of the economy out 
of this investment project. 
As we can see in the case considered, although these investments mean a source of 
employment and economic activity for the country, theysomehow reinforcethe classical 
investment pattern oriented to secure raw materials with limited linkages with the rest of 
the economy. Although some policy intervention, the Indo-Senegalese co-operation 
framework does not make a significant difference in terms of linking private 
investments with developmental outcomes. 
 
Tata in Senegal: market penetration supported by World Bank and Indian aid 
The Indian holding Tata has established a branch in Senegal, basically devoted to 
selling motor vehicles manufactured in India.16However, in the past the company tried 
to set up a factory to manufacture vehicles in the country and sell them in the region. 
The engagement of Tata in the country began in the early 90’s, when the Dakar public 
authorities, including the central government, launched a public transport bus renewal 
scheme with public funding, in which Tata participated as a supplier. The initiative, set 
in the broader framework of the PAMU (Programme d’Amélioration de la Mobilité 
Urbaine) was finally set up as a cofinancing scheme, in which the private bus operators 
                                                 
16
 Formally established as Tata Africa (Senegal) S.A.R.L., this branch depends on Tata Africa Holdings, 
based in Johannesburg. At the same time Tata Africa Holdings is a branch of Tata International (see 
http://www.tatainternational.com). 
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would pay 25 per cent of the cost of the new bus, and the rest would be paid by the GoS 
through a World Bank credit. It is claimed to have been the first ever programme of this 
kind in SSA.In September 2003 an international public tender for 505 urban buses to 
substitute a share of the 2,500-3,000 “car rapides” circulating around Dakar was 
launched. The contract was awarded to Tata International in January 2004 in a bid that 
totalled around 19 US$ million (Kumar and Diou 2010). 
In order to stimulate industrial value creation and backward linkages, another 
condition of the scheme was that the buses had to be assembled, at least partially, in 
Senegal. For this purpose the company Senbuswas created ad hoc, and based in Thiès. 
The local investors group SIFI (Sociétéd d’Intervention Financière S.A.) holds 93 per 
cent of the shares of Senbus are held by while the GoS owns the remaining 7 per cent.17 
To set up the assembly line of Tata buses in Senbus, the agreement included the 
detachment of 30 Tata specialists to train Senegalese workers. The project created some 
250 direct jobs. Some supplies were contracted to the workshops of SNCS, and it is 
estimated that 30 per cent of the value of the buses was added in Senbus.18 
In May 2004, Senbus delivered the first 105 buses to the private transport operators 
who joined the scheme. The remaining units were delivered progressively until 2008. 
Today, 505 Tata "car rapides" are circulating around Dakar. This entry strategy in the 
Senegalese and regional markets was reinforced in 2007 with another Exim Bank LOC 
granted to the GoS within the PAMU framework worth 17.87 US$ million to import 
350 urban buses, a deal executed the same year.19 Finally, in 2011 another contract was 
awarded to Tata to supply 300 bus kits to be assembled at Senbus, again in the 
framework of the renewal buses programme. This last project started to be executed in 
May 2012. 
Although in Senbus there has been some technological transfer, the extent of this 
transfer has been limited (Hazard et al. 2009, 1569). Today, Senbus is not a real 
integrated bus factory, but rather a limited assembly line with modest linkages with the 
                                                 
17SIFI is mainly owned by Senegalese cadres from SOCOCIM Industries, the biggest cement 
manufacturer in West Africa. SIFI also owns the local popular oil stations network Elton. 
18The regional projection of Senbus is displayed by the fact that at the inauguration of the factory in 
September 2003, the president of the country Abdoulaye Wade was present, and some other high 
representatives of neighbouring countries, like presidents OuldTaya (Mauritania), Compaoré (Burkina 
Faso), Pires (Cape Verde), and even El Bechir (Sudan). Wade underlined in his speech that Senbus “must 
be a regional enterprise oriented to the entire ECOWAS” (Afrik.com 2003).  In fact, these buses were 
called “les bus de l’intégration” by local media as noted in a Soleil article on May 28, 2004. 
19As a follow-up of the renewal programme, another contract was awarded to the Chinese company King 
Long with funding from China Eximbank in September 2009. Senbus set up a separate factory in Thiès 
for assembling these 406 King Long buses. 
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rest of the economy. The reason is that the demand for thiskind of vehicles is weak and 
strongly dependent on international co-operation programmes. It happens not only in 
Senegal, but as well at the regional level. Thus, the prospects of establishing an industry 
devoted to bus building are weak, and soare the industrial and technological linkages 
that this industry could develop. 
 
Indian aid programmes in Senegal 
ITEC offers scholarships for Senegalese students to study in India. It is a usual policy in 
SSC programmes since earlier times. The reason is because it doesn't involve large 
amounts of money as other projects like infrastructure construction does, and it creates 
long-lasting links between professionals in strategic areas like engineering in donor and 
recipient countries. In the academic year 2010-2011 15 slots were available and they 
were all utilised. In accordance with the agreements reached in the 2nd India-Africa 
Forum Summit (May 2011), the number of slots available for Senegalese students has 
risen to 45. Previously, following a G-15 meeting in 1997, the Indian government 
commissioned ITEC to set up centres for vocational training in different African 
countries. The outcome for Senegal was the Centre d’Entreprenariat et de 
Développement Technique (CEDT), known as the G-15, inaugurated in 2002 in Dakar 
and still in use today, but with no further Indian support. 
As pointed out in earlier sections, the main instrument of Indian co-operation in 
Senegal is the Exim Bank, since the bulk of the projects are financed through soft loans 
provided by this institution.20 From 2007 up to mid-2012, 8 projects have been funded 
by Exim Bank, totalling 130.5 US$ million. Interestingly, aid provided by Exim Bank is 
always explicitly tied. The suppliers of the projects must be companies registered in 
India with a 51 per cent shareholding by Indian residents. Simply put, the Exim Bank 
LOCs are openly an export promotion scheme. 
Through these credits, several Indian companies have made inroads in the 
Senegalese and regional markets. For instance in the agricultural sector, we can mention 
the equipment manufacturers Hindustan Machine Tools International (HMTI) and 
Kirloskar Bros. In the framework of the Programme de Développement Agricole 
Sénégalo-Indien (PDASI), a LOC was opened to import HMTI machinery intended for 
the irrigation and mechanical cultivation of 1,000 ha a year in the so-called Rice Belt, in 
                                                 
20As a HIPC country, Senegal is eligible for Exim Bank loans with an annual interest rate of 1.75 per 
cent, refundable in 20 years with a 5-year grace period included. 
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the river Senegal region, and to increase the yields of the cotton fields in the region of 
Tambacounda. In the framework of the Team-9 programme, the GoS benefited from 
another Exim Bank LOC worth 15 US$ million, which permitted the import in 2006 of 
510 tractors, also from HTMI. The final users (rural cooperatives) paid 60 per cent of 
the value of the tractors, but the rest was subsidised. 
The other Indian firm involved in the agricultural sector is Kirloskar Bros., a pump 
manufacturer. With the help of the Indian material and other co-operation programmes 
from other donors, the overall production and yields of the Senegalese rice culture has 
certainly increased. The causality between increased production and food security is not 
straightforward, and further research is required to assess the impact on food security of 
this increased production. Anyhow, since 2009, more than 30 per cent of domestic 
consumption is covered by domestic production (whereas in the 2007/2008 that figure 
was 12.1%21) satisfying partially the objectives of the trumpeted GoS’ GOANA plan 
(Grande Offensive Agricole pour la Nourriture et l’Abondance), launched in the 
2008/2009 season, amidst the global food crisis, which caused food prices to skyrocket, 
challenging the food security of poor people in developing countries.22 
Other projects have been executed thanks to Exim Bank LOCs. For instance, there is 
the investment in Le Petit Train de Banlieue (PTB), a light urban train that links Dakar 
and Rufisque, on the outskirts of Dakar. In 2005 PTB commissioned five locomotives 
and 20 coaches to RITES (Rail India Technical and Economic Services), an Indian 
public engineering firm founded in 1974 and based in Delhi, and strongly dependent on 
the Indian Railways company. Another relevant project is the setting up of cold storage 
facilities tosupportthe agro industry in the country. In October 2008, Expotec 
International, part of the larger Lucky Group, signed a contract with the Ministry of 
Maritime Economy, in which 15 Independent Cold Storage facilities for fish, fruit and 
vegetables would be set up all over the country.There are also projects of rural 
electrification, training in ICT, and medical equipment supply. 
In sum, Exim Bank LOCs in Senegal are an instrument of co-operation that 
combines commercial objectives (promotion of Indian exports), and somehow 
Senegalese developmental needs of acquiring capital. However, it is not possible to 
perceive an integrated plan to incorporate these acquisitions of capital to a long-term 
                                                 
21
 Own calculations from PSD On-line (US Department of Agriculture), see 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline (accessed July 25, 2013). 
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development plan, either comprehensive or sectorial, it is rather an accumulation of 
projects driven by opportunity. 
A relevant feature worth highlighting is the regional projection of Indian presence in 
Senegal. The private and public presence of India in Senegal has a remarkable regional 
projection, consistent with the traditional openness of Senegal to the region. For 
instance, in 2008 the 4th CII-EXIM BANK Regional Conclave on Africa Project 
Partnership, promoted by the influential Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), took 
place in Dakar, underlining the strategic interests of India in the country as a bridgehead 
to West Africa.23Other prominent examples of this regional consideration of Senegal are 
the regional character of the Exim Bank branch in Dakar, and the establishment of 
regional headquarters by Indian private firms like Ranbaxy or Arcelor Mittal. As we 
have seen above, the ICS and Tata ventures in the country had as well a part of regional 
projections 
A particular case of the regional projection of the Indian presence in Senegal is the 
Pan-African e-Network, a major continental telecommunications project funded by the 
GoI in the framework of its commitment with NEPAD. Not surprisingly, the central 
operational hub is near Dakar, as the GoS has shown leadership commitment in the 
NEPAD since its inception. The GoI signed a partnership with the African Union in 
February 2009 to set up the project at a cost of around 116 US$ million. The project 
consists of establishing a telecommunications network between India and Africa. The 
network connects Indian universities and hospitals with a data centre in New Delhi, 
which is placed in the headquarters of the Indian contractor, TCIL (Telecommunications 
Consultants India Ltd.). Then, the Dakar hub station receives the signal and broadcasts 
it to the RASCOM satellite to distribute it to the African network clients, and vice 
versa.24That will make tele-education and telemedicine available on a large scale. TCIL 
is to hand over the network to the African Union in July 2014. 
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 The price of imported rice increased around 47 per cent between 2007 and 2008 (Ministère de 
l’Agriculture 2009, 99). 
23
 CII promotes since 2005 an annual conclave that gathers the key actors, public and private, of the 
Indian presence in SSA. With the support of the Exim Bank and the GoI, there is an annual meeting in 
New Delhi, called CII-EXIM BANK Conclave on Africa Project Partnership. Besides these continental 
meetings there are Regional Conclaves. Between 2005 and 2011 there have been 13. 
24
 The Pan-African e-network takes advantage of a system of submarine fibre cables already working. 
This system splits in two tranches. The first one, called SAFE (South Africa-Far East), goes from Kochi 
(Kerala, Southern India) to Melkbosstrandin South Africa, near Cape Town. The main stakeholders of 
SAFE include Tata Communications, AT&T (US), Telkom (South Africa). The second tranche of the 
system linksMelkbosstrand and Sesimbra (Portugal), all along the West African Coast, which lands in 
several coastal countries, including Senegal. RASCOM stands for Regional African Satellite 
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TCIL is an Indian publicly owned company, which supports the efforts of the 
powerful telecommunications sector in India. Thus, we can interpret the development of 
the Pan-African e-Network as a support from the GoI to the expansion of the Indian 
telecom industry in Africa (Naidu 2010, 47). The tele-education side of the network also 
serves the expansion of the education services of Indian universities, another powerful 
sector. 25Nevertheless, the technological transfer of the project to Senegalese or African 
counterparts certainly weak, although three years have passed since the start of the 
project; the interest in the project shown by the Senegalese authorities is weak for the 
moment. 
 
Conclusions 
The current trend of relations between India and Africa shows a greater interdependence 
among developing countries in terms of SSC. The BRICS emergence has reinforced 
such links not only through increasing external trade and foreign direct investment 
flows contributing to the reconfiguration of the world economy in a multipolar way, but 
also through public cooperation mechanisms fostering SSC. The case of India in 
Senegal is an example of this emerging framework of cooperation among developing 
countries. 
Although the Indian presence in Senegal is still modest, there is a growing interest 
and involvement in the Senegalese economy. India’s late coming to the liberalisation 
process and integration in the world economy on one hand, and specific economic 
features of Senegal –not well endowed in raw materials- on the other hand, explain the 
still low profile of such relationships in economic terms. While Senegal is not a leading 
supplier or an emerging investment market for the Indian economy, there has been an 
increasing rhythm of mutual interdependence in recent years, and it is foreseeable that 
this growing trend will continue in the near future. 
But it is beyond macroeconomic data where we can distinguish the particular form 
that the economic and political India-Senegal interdependence adopts. If we view 
relationships in terms of cooperation, which includes not only trade and investment but 
                                                                                                                                               
Communication Organization, and is a Pan-African intergovernmental organisation. RASCOM was 
established in 1992 with the mission to establish and exploit a Pan-African satellite communications 
system, overcoming the dependence on the Western communications infrastructure. 
25
 Actually, the pilot project was set up in Ethiopia and consisted in 26 students successfully completing 
an MBA programme at the Indira Ghandi National Open University (IGNOU) in New Delhi. 
23 
 
also technical assistance, soft loans or preferential trade treatment, we can consider that 
a ‘new’ framework of cooperation appears. In this framework the relationship between 
both countries develops in a different manner than in the traditional North-South 
cooperation pattern. What we have called ‘public nature’ and ’policy space’ as featuring 
growing socioeconomic links between India and Senegal can be deduced from case 
studies of Indian involvement in the Senegalese economy. The key question that arises 
is to what extent the growing relations between India and Senegal constitute a ‘win-win’ 
partnership. To answer this question has required analysis of the Indian presence in 
Senegal at both private and public levels. 
The first case studied is the leading industrial company in Senegal, Industries 
Chimiques du Sénegal, which is owned and controlled by an Indian private consortium 
with a small participation by the GoS. Different phases of recapitalisation of the 
company have been sustained on agreement between the Indian consortium and the 
GoS, based on shared interests. While the Indian consortium secures the provision of a 
crucial input for producing fertilisers for Indian agriculture, the GoS keeps first stage 
manufacturing of phosphoric acid in the country with some employment and investment 
linkages. The case of HMTI, Kirloskar Bros. and Tata provide other examples of 
reinforcing mutual links through shared interests. 
It is possible to conclude that a new kind of partnership between both countries could 
open the door to mutual economic benefits. Anyhow, to realise this potentialthere is a 
need of a targeted policy (especially on the Senegalese side) able to redirect 
investments, imports, and aid to fulfil internal development goals. Today there is not 
any comprehensive plan on the Senegalese side to allocate the resources coming from 
the Indian partnership. 
The short-term perspective of such a partnership prevents elucidation of evident 
impacts, but present analysis allows us to foresee a new kind of cooperation and the 
linked potentialities in development terms. So, these case studies allow us to consider 
the forging of a new kind of cooperation between developing countries based on shared 
interests. In fact, these benefits in terms of linkages shape an emerging pattern of 
cooperation. Three features of this pattern can be highlighted: i) public-private 
cooperation is explicit under the premise of ‘equal’ partners; ii) cooperation policies are 
geared in some degree to productive capacity development, although they are not 
                                                                                                                                               
Significantly, the educational programmes offered by the Indian universities are mainly focused in the 
area of business administration and ICT. 
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articulated in the framework of a Senegalese active industrial policy; iii) aid 
programmes are not conditioned to macroeconomic or governance objectives. 
All these factors, which underpin the new framework of SSC, can foster better 
outcomes for developing partners in a context of unbalanced capitalist globalisation. 
The case of the India-Senegal partnership shows how incipient industrial linkages and 
agricultural sufficiency can be a beneficial outcome of such cooperation. So, even 
though the contribution of the Indian presence in Senegal is still limited today in terms 
of productive linkages and human development, as shown in the article the foundations 
and the content of this partnership permits to foresee some scope for future 
developmental outcomes in Senegal. 
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Table 1. Indian Presence in Senegal 
Firms 
Name Activity Observations 
Industries Chimiques du Sénégal Phosphate rock extraction; phosphoric acid; fertilisers. Main industry of the country. An Indian consortium holds 8 per cent of shares. 
ArcelorMittal Iron ore extraction. Project suspended 
Tata Motors Senegal Import and commercialisation of Tata Vehicles Tata participated in the establishment of Senbus and has benefited from Exim Bank LOCs and World Bank’s credits 
Ajanta Pharma, Ranbaxy, National Institute 
of Information Technologies (NIIT), CSL. Commerce, formation, civil works. 
 
Aid Programmes 
Institution/Instrument Activity Firms involved Observations 
Exim Bank LOCs 
Supply of buses and spares  Tata Motors Upgrading of the urban buses system (Dakar Dem Dikk). Amount: 17.87 US$ million. 
Acquisition of railway coaches and locomotives Rites 
Upgrading of the Petit Train de Banlieu. Shared 
project with Mali, in the framework of the Team-9 
Initiative. Amount for Senegal: 7.08 US$ million. 
Irrigation project Kirloskar Bros Project under the framework of the Team-9 Initiative. Amount: 27 US$ million. 
Women poverty alleviation programme and acquisition 
of vehicles HMTI and Tata Motors Amount: 11 US$ million. 
IT training projects  Amount: 10 US$ million. 
Rural electrification project and fishing industry 
development project Angelique, Expotech Amount: 25 US$ million. 
Supply of medical equipments  Amount: 4 US$ million. 
Rural electrification project Not yet awarded Amount: 27.5 US$ million. 
ITEC (Indian Technical and Economic 
Cooperation) 
Scholarships  
Academic year 2010/2011: 15 slots available for 
Senegalese students. Academic year 2011/2012: 45 
slots. 
Establishment of the Centre d’Entreprenariat et de 
Développement Technique (CEDT) HMTI Amount: 4.5 US$ million. 
India’s Duty Free Tariff Preference Scheme for LDCs  
Senegalese exports potentially benefited: cotton, 
cashew nuts, sugarcane and ready-made garments, 
among others. 
Pan-African e-Network TCIL (Telecommunications Consultants India Ltd.) 
Amount: 116 US$ million (4 US$ million spent in 
Senegal) 
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